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Disparate Impacts of Performance Funding Research Incentives on
Research Expenditures and State Appropriations
Xiaodan Hu
Northern Illinois University
Justin C. Ortagus
Nicholas Voorhees
University of Florida
Kelly Rosinger
Pennsylvania State University
Robert Kelchen
University of Tennessee–Knoxville
Performance-based funding (PBF) policies with research incentives have grown in popularity over the years despite little
understanding regarding whether they actually work. This study leverages a novel national data set to examine the impact of
PBF research incentives on the research expenditures and total state appropriations among public 4-year institutions, with a
particular focus on minority-serving institutions. We find that PBF research incentives had no impact on the total amount or
relative share of total research expenditures or the total amount of state appropriations allocated to treated institutions,
regardless of minority-serving institution status. PBF policies that allowed institutions to self-select or opt into including
research incentives as part of their PBF formula had a positive impact on the relative share of expenditures allocated to
research and total state appropriations.
Keywords: accountability, educational policy, finance, higher education, minorities, quasi-experimental analysis

Introduction
Public 4-year universities in the United States, which are
subsidized by government appropriations, typically have
institutional missions centered on a combination of research,
teaching, and service (Rhoten & Calhoun, 2011). The
research function of higher education is critically important
to not only institutional prestige but also economic development (e.g., Eid, 2012; Guisan, 2005; Jongbloed et al., 2008;
Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006). State policy makers look to
colleges and universities to foster research activities as a
way to improve innovation and economic development
within their individual states, and a growing number of
states have begun to increase their financial commitment to
efforts designed to expand the research capacity of their public colleges and universities (Toutkoushian & Paulsen,
2016).
Performance-based funding (PBF), which has grown in
popularity and is currently used by two thirds of states, ties a
portion of a public college or university’s level of state

appropriations to institutional outcomes (Ortagus et al.,
2020). The metrics states use to evaluate institutional performance most often include student outcomes, such as progression toward a degree and degree production, but an
increasing share of PBF systems are focusing specifically on
a given institution’s research activities (Rosinger et al.,
2020). Research metrics for PBF-adopting states have varied
over the years but often include institutions’ research expenditures from externally funded grants and broad measures of
research and development (R&D) expenditures. Slightly
fewer than half (19) of the 41 states that have adopted PBF
over time have included research-oriented metrics within
their PBF formulas (authors’ calculations). Research incentives in PBF systems encourage institutions to support
research activities by tying state appropriations to researchoriented expenditures and outcomes in alignment with the
institutional missions of public research universities (Burke,
1998; Miller, 2016; Snyder & Boelscher, 2018). But PBF
can increase the tension between policy makers’ desire to
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hold institutions accountable and the financial realities of
already underresourced colleges or universities (Boland,
2020; Hillman & Corral, 2018).
Due to the unequal funding distribution of public higher
education, minority-serving institutions (MSIs), in particular, often receive insufficient resources to maximize their
research capabilities and are left with limited financial flexibility when compared with predominantly White institutions (Boland & Gasman, 2014; Cunningham et al., 2014).
Similarly, less-resourced institutions, such as MSIs, may not
receive enough support from the state to substantially alter
their expenditures in ways that would boost their research
capacity (Leslie et al., 2012; Ryan, 2004). PBF policies typically lead to funding systems in which already-advantaged
institution types receive a disproportionate share of funding
and underfunded institutions, such as MSIs, are asked to
continually do more with less (Hagood, 2019; Hillman &
Corral, 2018; Li et al., 2018; Ortagus et al., 2020) and have
a higher share of funding at stake in PBF systems (T. Jones
et al., 2017). For MSIs, the unique mission of these institution types related to serving targeted student populations is
often overlooked in PBF metrics (Gasman et al., 2017).
While a large body of previous research has focused on
the intended and unintended consequences of PBF on students’ academic outcomes (Hillman et al., 2014; Ortagus
et al., 2020; Umbricht et al., 2017), PBF policies incentivizing research activities have a substantive impact on institutional behavior but have yet to be studied in the academic
literature. To examine the impact of PBF with research
incentives on the behaviors of public 4-year colleges and
universities with a focus on MSIs, this study is guided by the
following research questions:
Research Question 1: To what extent do PBF research
incentives influence the level of research expenditures
at public 4-year institutions?
Research Question 2: To what extent do PBF research
incentives influence the total state appropriations
received by public 4-year institutions?
Research Question 3: Does the influence of PBF policies with research incentives vary according to an
institution’s MSI status?
Literature Review
Research incentives featured less prominently than student-oriented measures of institutional performance in early
PBF policies during the 1990s (now known as PBF 1.0),
emphasizing states’ strategic investment in degree completion over institutional prestige indicators (Burke 1998;
Dougherty & Natow, 2015; Toutkoushian & Danielson,
2002). However, PBF policies have linked a portion of state
appropriations to research outcomes for certain institutions
since the 1990s. Roughly two thirds of states that operated
2

PBF 1.0 systems adopted a research metric for at least one
institution (Burke & Serban, 1998; Dougherty & Natow,
2015), and states have incorporated measures of research
activity into more recent PBF policies (known as PBF 2.0)
at a similar rate (Rabovsky, 2012). As one example, every
university in Florida’s State University System is able to
choose whether or not to include research expenditures as
one of its 10 performance metrics (Cornelius & Cavanaugh,
2016; Snyder & Fox, 2016). PBF policies in other states,
such as Kansas, Maine, and Montana, have tied state appropriations to research activity for a small subset of 4-year
institutions within each state (Boelscher & Snyder, 2019).
Research Expenditures at Public 4-Year Institutions
The level of institutional expenditures on research activities plays a pivotal role in the extent to which a college or
university is able to increase its ranking or institutional prestige (Morse & Brooks, 2021; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006),
research productivity (Dundar & Lewis, 1998; Eid, 2012),
and other important outcomes related to institutional efficiency and effectiveness (Powell et al., 2012; Robst, 2001).
For example, R&D expenditures in higher education in
European countries were positively related to innovation
(Pegkas et al., 2019). Guisan (2005) pointed out that research
expenditures at universities in the United States greatly contribute to regional development and solidify a comparative
advantage relative to the majority of European regions and
countries.
American colleges and universities spent nearly $84 billion on R&D in Fiscal Year 2019, with more than half of all
expenditures coming from federal funds (Gibbons, 2021).
Most of this funding goes to support university-based
research projects and facilities, but indirect cost recovery
from federal grants can be an important source of general
operating revenue for the largest research universities
(Ledford, 2014). The level of a given institution’s reliance
on research expenditures is largely dependent on its available revenue sources and stability in funding (Leslie et al.,
2012). Historically, private 4-year universities have higher
levels of research expenditures than public colleges and universities (Blasdell et al., 1993). Moreover, private universities have accelerated their spending on research activities
and have experienced corresponding advantages in institutional prestige over the years (Lau & Rosen, 2016), including when it comes to recruiting faculty (Alexander, 2001;
Rippner & Toutkoushian, 2015).
Due to the ways in which the prestige structure in
American higher education emphasizes research resources
(Brewer et al., 2004; Stocum, 2013), MSIs can face pressure
to demonstrate traditional measures of research resources as
institutional quality indicators (W. A. Jones, 2013; O’Meara,
2007). As a growing number of MSIs seek to maximize their
prestige (Contreras et al., 2008; Doran, 2015), one approach
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is to increase their research capacity and potentially obtain a
larger share of state funding. However, MSIs have been
underfunded in ways that may restrict their ability to expand
their research expenditures and build their research capacity
(Cunningham et al., 2014; Gasman & Commodore, 2014).
Prior research attributes these funding disparities to
unequal state funding systems, including PBF (Hillman &
Corral, 2018; T. Jones et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018) and
insufficient support from federal R&D funds (Boland &
Gasman, 2014; Matthews, 2011; National Center for
Science and Engineering Statistics, 2021).
Due to the institutional mission of MSIs focused on
empowering racially marginalized students before implementing prestige-seeking behaviors, MSI faculty often carry
larger teaching and advising loads and receive lower levels
of research support when compared with non-MSI faculty
(Clark et al., 2016). With an increasing number of MSIs
seeking to emphasize institutional prestige and become
research-intensive institutions (Contreras et al., 2008; Doran,
2015; O’Meara, 2007), it is critical to understand the potential impact of state-level policies on research expenditures
for MSIs. While previous research has centered around the
impact of PBF on student success at MSIs (Boland, 2020;
Hu, 2019), little is known regarding the extent to which PBF
policies with research-oriented metrics may alter institutional expenditure patterns at MSIs or the extent to which
these policies impact state appropriations these institutions
receive.
Incentivizing Research Activities With Performance-Based
Funding
To incentivize research activities, many European countries (e.g., Belgium, Italy, Norway, Sweden) have adopted
PBF with varying provisions related specifically to research
activities. In general, previous research has found that PBF
adoption within European countries is positively related to
research productivity for colleges and universities (Aagaard
et al., 2015; Cattaneo et al., 2016; Checchi et al., 2019; Sīle
& Vanderstraeten, 2018; Vanecek, 2014). However, the
impact of PBF on research productivity can vary greatly
depending on the academic discipline (Engels et al., 2012)
and selectivity of the institution (Abramo et al., 2011), which
can exacerbate already-existing inequities among colleges
and universities (Mateos-González & Boliver, 2019).
Because the funding mechanisms and accountability systems for higher education in European countries are fundamentally different from the ones in the United States (e.g.,
Cretan & Gherghina, 2015), it is unclear if PBF with research
incentives functions similarly to influence institutional
behaviors in the U.S. context.
In the United States, state governments currently provide
funding for about 5% of all university R&D expenditures
(Gibbons, 2021), and this money is generally separate from

capital appropriations used to build new facilities. However,
interest in tying state funding to research funding and productivity has grown over time. Indiana’s research incentive
was the first metric used to measure performance in the
state’s PBF program (Umbricht et al., 2017), whereas other
PBF states have incorporated research-oriented metrics into
existing systems. PBF policies incentivize research activity
for universities by tying state funding to R&D metrics relating to the academic, economic, and research-related missions of institutions. While a common measure of research
activity is externally generated research funding (e.g.,
Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee, 2012), PBF
policies also incentivize nonmonetary research outcomes,
such as increasing entrepreneurship and commercialization
(Kansas Board of Regents, 2019), technology transfer, and
licensing and patents (Board of Governors of the State
University System of Florida, 2019; Board of Trustees of
State Institutions of Higher Learning, 2013). PBF systems in
South Dakota and Tennessee have linked research funding to
educational opportunities for students (South Dakota Board
of Regents, 2000; Tennessee Higher Education Commission,
2015), while research metrics in Kansas are meant to encourage R&D activity at universities that improve employment
outcomes for students and support state economic priorities
(Kansas Board of Regents, 2019). The amount of institutional funding tied to research metrics has ranged from
roughly 1% of state funding in Mississippi (Board of
Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, 2013) to
nearly 20% of performance funding in New Mexico (New
Mexico Higher Education Department, 2018). Prior studies
have examined the relationship between PBF adoption and
university research activity and expenditures, despite their
common drawback of not actually identifying PBF programs
with research incentives.
Early PBF programs in Florida and South Carolina coincided with increases in externally funded research activity
(Shin & Milton, 2004). Using spline linear modeling to
explain variation in research funding at 4-year colleges and
universities from 1997 to 2007, Shin (2010) determined that
institutional characteristics, rather than PBF policies, contribute to institutional differences in revenue growth from
federal research grants and contracts. Kelchen and Stedrak
(2016) reported that PBF adoption was not related to expenditures for research for all 4-year institutions; however, PBF
policies were associated with decreases in annual research
spending of less than 1% for research universities specifically (Rabovsky, 2012). Spending of gift, grant, and contract
revenues by research universities in PBF states was also
associated with minimal decreases in state appropriations
(Rabovsky, 2012).
State policy makers’ desires to measure efficiency and
productivity can create tension with measures of institutional performance given the complexity of varying institutional missions (T. Jones, 2016). On the adoption of any
3
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performance-oriented programs, including PBF and other
performance budgeting programs, research funding has been
found to increase at flagship universities specifically, while
nonflagship universities experienced decreases in both
research funding and publication activity (Payne & Roberts,
2010). Forty-one states have adopted PBF over time (Ortagus
et al., 2020), but 22 of those PBF-adopting states have never
included research-oriented metrics in their PBF formula.
Previous literature related to PBF adoption and researchrelated priorities offers mixed findings due in part to the
misalignment between the policy lever and outcomes being
examined (i.e., the metrics of PBF systems vary across
states and may not incentivize research-related outcomes).
Although prior work has identified numerous PBF studies
with strong difference-in-differences designs to support
causal inference (Ortagus et al., 2020), recent developments
in econometrics literature have shown that any differencein-differences study with time-varying policy adoption is
subject to a host of methodological threats that were not
addressed in previous PBF literature (e.g., Goodman-Bacon,
2021; Sun & Abraham, 2020). In this study, we offer the first
evidence to date related to the direct impact of PBF research
incentives and the subsequent research activities and level of
state appropriations among PBF-adopting institutions.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study is guided by principal agent theory, which suggests that the principal (state
government) pays the agent (public college or university) to
carry out an objective (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Spence &
Zeckhauser, 1971). In the case of PBF policies that center
research-oriented metrics, the objective relates to investing
in (and ultimately producing) research in ways that can
improve the prestige of the institution and a given state’s
economic environment. Importantly, the logic of any principal–agent model rests on the assumption that the outcomes
of the agent (e.g., investments in research activities) must be
observable and measurable by both the principal and agent.
For external resource providers, such as the state government, the extent to which they can influence a public institution’s behavior depends on whether the resource being
provided is deemed critical and not obtained easily by
another funding source (Emerson, 1962; Harnisch, 2011). In
addition, Rabovsky (2012) has reported that shifts in how
states allocate resources will likely lead to the adoption of
new strategies by colleges and universities seeking to
enhance their performance according to the prescribed funding formula. Under a resource dependence perspective, any
public colleges or universities that rely heavily on state
appropriations may alter their institutional behaviors in
response to changes in their state’s funding criteria, such as
the introduction of a PBF metric incentivizing research
activities.
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PBF policies are typically created to directly tie at least a
portion of public institutions’ state funding to their academic
outcomes, with a particular focus on the intended outcomes
of student retention and degree completion (Ortagus et al.,
2020). The logical rationale of principal–agent theory coupled with a resource dependence perspective (e.g., Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) suggests that public research universities,
which rely heavily on state funding allocations, are likely to
respond to the implementation of PBF in ways that will
increase their ability to garner state funding by leveraging
resources to improve their performance on the particular
metrics states incentivize. In the case of research-oriented
performance metrics, institutions may respond by reorganizing their activities in search of external resources and thereby
increasing their research output and expenditures. Prior
research, for example, has found that colleges in states with
PBF metrics that incentivized science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields led to increases in
STEM degree production (Li, 2020).
While PBF with STEM incentives has been effective at
increasing degree production in those fields, a large body of
research indicates PBF has not consistently led to improvements in overall degree production (Ortagus et al., 2020).
Although principal–agent and resource dependence theories
offer an explanation of how institutions may respond to state
incentives, performance management research has shown
that performance reform efforts frequently fail to meet their
stated objectives (Radin, 2006; Thompson, 1999). This literature has noted that complex structures, organizations, and
politics can limit reform efforts’ ability to improve outcomes, and in practice, can lead to unintended consequences
(Radin, 2006). Prior research on PBF has noted that underresourced institutional types, such as MSIs, face capacity
and financial constraints when it comes to reorganizing
activities to align with PBF incentives (Hillman et al., 2014).
The historic underfunding of MSIs may limit their capacity
to increase research infrastructure and meet their PBF goals
(Boland & Gasman, 2014; Cunningham et al., 2014; Leslie
et al., 2012; Ryan, 2004), putting them at a further disadvantage when it comes to state funding linked to R&D activities.
In addition, these institutions often receive a larger share of
institutional revenues from state appropriations (Kelchen
et al., 2020), making them simultaneously more likely to
respond to state incentives but also more vulnerable if they
are unable to improve on particular metrics.
Prior work has reported that traditional PBF systems disadvantage underresourced institutional types, particularly
MSIs, while the same policy can considerably benefit more
advantaged institutional types (Hagood, 2019; Hillman &
Corral, 2018; T. Jones et al., 2017). The introduction of additional metrics in PBF programs that incentivize research
and prestige-seeking behaviors may exacerbate alreadyexisting inequities facing MSIs in PBF-adopting states.
Given these dynamics, this study explores what happens
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after PBF policies with research incentives are introduced,
focusing specifically on the institutional responses of public
research universities and MSIs within these PBF systems.
Methods
Data and Sample
In this study, we use institution-level data from Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), and statelevel data from the Council of State Governments and the
National Association of State Budget Officers. We identified
every public university in the United States subject to a PBF
program that includes research incentives by systematically
analyzing more than 2,000 state budget or policy documents
between 1997 and 2020 (Kelchen et al., 2019; Ortagus et al.,
2021). These documents include state appropriation bills,
state budgets, policy documents, audit reports, financial
statements, higher education commission or coordinating
board reports, personal communication with higher education policy makers, and other firsthand sources that provide
information for the years of operation, amounts of funding at
stake, sectors and institutions affected, and performance
metrics of PBF policies. In addition, we leveraged the
Wayback Machine when older budget or policy documents
were no longer available online. These data collection procedures allowed our research team to obtain accurate information pertaining to PBF policy adoption, whether the PBF
policy was actually funded, the timing of the PBF policy,
and the specific PBF policy metrics. The analysis window
for this study is 2002 to 2018, which is when data on research
expenditures in IPEDS aligns with the years from the PBF
data set.
To select institutions with comparable mission and
research capacity, we restricted our sample to public 4-year
universities that were classified as doctoral research universities or master’s colleges and universities based on the 2000
Carnegie classification. We included master’s institutions
that annually conferred more than 40 master’s degrees
because many master’s institutions are eligible to include
PBF research incentives in PBF-adopting states (e.g.,
Tennessee and Florida). We excluded institutions that did
not offer any undergraduate programs or closed between
2002 and 2018. To examine the influence of PBF with
research incentives on institutional research expenditures,
we excluded institutions in states that either adopted or
abandoned PBF with research incentives in the first 2 years
(2001–2002, 2002–2003) or the past 2 years (2016–2017,
2017–2018) as a way to ensure at least 2 years of preand posttreatment observations, respectively (Wooldridge,
2002). The final panel data set consisted of 17 years of
observations from 374 public universities (n = 6,333), with
data for some years missing for 3% of institutions.
Finally, we created an MSI indicator and created an
MSI subgroup (n = 1,882) and a non–minority-serving

institution (NMSI) subgroup with 263 institutions (n =
4,450) after identifying an institution’s MSI eligibility prior
to 2004 defined by the Office of Postsecondary Education
(2021). The 111 MSI institutions consist of 25 historically
Black colleges and universities or any colleges or universities eligible to be primarily Black institutions, 49 Hispanicserving institutions, 65 colleges or universities eligible to be
Asian American and Native American Pacific IslanderServing Institutions or Alaska Native and Native Hawaiianserving institutions, and seven Native American-Serving
Nontribal Institutions.1 Due to the composition and size of
the MSIs included in the current study, we caution the readers to interpret our findings as the average treatment effects
on treated MSIs that may not be statistically generalizable to
all MSIs in the United States.
Variables
The dependent variables for this study are (1) the amount
of research expenditures transformed using a natural logarithm, (2) the relative share of research expenditures relative
to total expenditures, (3) the annual change in the total
amount of research expenditures, (4) the amount of state
appropriations transformed using a natural logarithm, and
(5) the annual change of total amount of state appropriations.
The treatment variable is a binary indicator of an approved
PBF policy that includes research incentives, with the treatment turning on or off at the institution level. By approved
PBF policy, we mean a policy through which funds could be
allocated based in part on institutional performance existed
in state legislation or, if a state higher education agency allocated state dollars to institutions, existed in board documents. The treatment variable is coded as 1 for institutions
subject to PBF policies with research incentives, and it is
coded as 0 if PBF is not in place or the PBF policy does not
have research incentives for the institution. Between 2002
and 2018, 64 institutions across 13 states were subject to
approved PBF policies that included research incentives (see
Figure 1 and Supplemental Appendix A, available in the
online version of this article).
Because the binary treatment variable only captures
adoption and potentially masks the complexity of PBF policies, exploratory studies need to identify how PBF policies
with varying designs affect financial outcomes of institutions, particularly those that are already underresourced
(Bell et al., 2018; Ortagus et al., 2020). Thus, we used variations of the treatment indicator in additional model specifications to capture (1) if the PBF research incentives were
actually funded and (2) if PBF-adopting institutions were
given the option to include research incentives as part of
their PBF formula (i.e., the research-oriented metric was
not mandated). Among institution-year observations subject
to PBF research incentives, 83.9% of the observations were
actually funded and coded as 1 for the first alternative
5

Empirical Strategy

Figure 1. Performance-based funding (PBF) research
incentives in place by state for eligible institutions.

To estimate the average treatment effect of PBF research
incentives on treated institutions’ institutional research
expenditures and state appropriations (our first two research
questions), we used a generalized difference-in-differences
(GDiD) model, which allows the treatment to turn on or off
for the individual institution between 2002 and 2018 (Angrist
& Pischke, 2009). Specifically, the GDiD estimator ( δ1 ) was
used to compare the difference in the outcomes between
treated and untreated units after the adoption of PBF research
incentives and then subtract the difference in outcomes
before the adoption of PBF research incentives. Formally,
we used ordinary least squares regression in the model, holding covariates constant:
yij = β0 + δ1treatmentij + ci + h j + Z ij + δij + εij

specification. Institutions with no PBF research incentive or
a PBF research incentive that was not actually funded were
coded as 0. The treatment variable for the second alternative
specification is coded in a categorical manner, indicating
whether colleges and universities are granted autonomy to
choose a research-oriented PBF metric. PBF-adopting institutions that were able to opt in for research metrics (coded as
2 in this additional specification) represent 41.8% of all institution-year observations subject to PBF policies with research
incentives. Institutions subject to PBF policies that mandated
the use of research incentives were coded as 1. Institutions
with no PBF research incentives were coded as 0.
In the outcome model examining research expenditures,
we controlled for both state- and institution-level covariates
that could affect the level of research expenditures or state
appropriations. We included two state-level covariates: state
legislative control indicating if the same party held both the
legislative chamber and the governorship and the percentage
of state annual appropriations allocated to higher education
(Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016; McLendon et al., 2009).
Institution-level variables included institutional characteristics of enrollment size and MSI status (Cunningham et al.,
2014; Rabovsky, 2012), percentage of applicants admitted as
a proxy for selectivity (Kim, 2018), revenues (e.g., revenue
from tuition and fees per full-time equivalent [FTE] student,
revenue from state appropriations per FTE student, revenue
from federal, state, local/private contract and grant per FTE
student, respectively; Leslie et al., 2012), and instructional
cost per FTE as a proxy for competing institutional expenses
(McClure & Titus, 2018). To examine the impact of PBF
policies with research incentives on total state appropriations, we removed state appropriations as a control variable
but instead controlled for the presence of any PBF policy for
the 4-year sector (including PBF systems that did not include
research incentives; Hagood, 2019). All dollar values were
adjusted for inflation and online Supplemental Appendix B
lists all variables and their sources used in our analyses.
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where yij represents the outcome variables at institution i
in year j. β0 is an institution-specific intercept. Treatment is
an indicator of the adoption of PBF research incentives (and
its alternative specifications) for institution i in year j. δ1 is
the coefficient of interest. ci represents the time-invariant
institution-level fixed effect, and hj represents the year fixed
effect. By incorporating institution and year fixed effects, the
model controls for potential institution-specific effects over
time as well as any time effects that were common across
institutions in each year (Allison, 2009). Zij is a vector of
state- and institution-level covariates described in the previous section. We also included institution-specific linear time
trends ( δij ) by interacting institution fixed effects with a continuous time trend (Furquim et al., 2020). To correct for heteroscedasticity and serially correlated error terms in panel
data (Bertrand et al., 2004), we estimated robust standard
errors in each model by clustering at the institution level.
Prior research on PBF policies has shown that PBFadopting institutions may need to take a year or two to alter
their behavior in response to policy changes (e.g., Gándara,
2019; Li & Ortagus, 2019). In practice, changes in research
expenditures in particular can be lagged due to the application and award process of major grants (e.g., at least 10
months for National Science Foundation grants). To account
for potential delays in institutions’ response to PBF research
incentives, we estimated additional specifications modeling
a 1-year lag and a 2-year lag to capture both the lagged effect
under treatment and the persistent effect despite treatment
suspension. Additionally, to examine whether institutional
responses to PBF research incentives or level of state appropriations institutions receive differ based on an institution’s
MSI status (our third research question), we estimated the
equation identified above for subsamples comprised solely
of MSIs and NMSIs, respectively.
To better account for the impact of PBF research
incentives on institutional research expenditures and state
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appropriations, we selected multiple comparison groups of
untreated institutions to construct counterfactual situations
of institutional responses in the absence of PBF research
incentives (Meyer, 1995). The first comparison group was
restricted to 198 public 4-year universities that were not subject to PBF research incentives in adjacent or neighboring
untreated states (Cook et al., 2008). The second comparison
group was a national sample of 294 public 4-year universities that were not subject to PBF research incentives in all
untreated states.
For the third comparison group, we accounted for differences across institutions by using inverse propensity score
weighting (IPSW). The logic of IPSW requires researchers
to leverage pretreatment covariates in order to improve balance and reduce bias by creating statistically comparable
institutions in the comparison group (Guo & Fraser, 2015;
Ho et al., 2007). Specifically, we estimated a logit model
predicting a college’s probability of being subject to PBF
research incentives conditional on all institution-level
covariates and other characteristics related to the institution’s likelihood of being treated (i.e., location, affiliated
hospital, medical degree conferring status; Birdsall, 2019;
McClure & Titus, 2018). After removing seven institutions
with extreme propensity scores (Austin & Stuart, 2015), we
used the inverse of the propensity score to weight each institution based on its likelihood of adopting PBF research
incentives then applied to all descriptive and regression
analyses to estimate the average treatment effect of PBF
research incentives on treated institutions for the third comparison group. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of
the variables for the treatment and comparison groups.
We applied the same procedure to the MSI and NMSI
subsamples to create multiple comparison groups. Table 2
and Figure 2 present the balance for the unweighted and
weighted groups, indicating that we met the common support assumption for the full sample and NMSI subsample.
However, due to the small number of MSIs in the base year
(n = 110), we did not meet the common support assumption
using the IPSW approach. To create a comparison group of
MSIs for the treated MSIs with PBF research incentives, we
also used a coarsened exact matching (CEM) approach (see
Hillman et al. [2014] and Hu et al. [2020] for examples of
prior quasi-experimental work employing a CEM approach).
Different from IPSW, CEM matches institutions based on
select characteristics to improve balance for each variable in
isolation rather than using one propensity score based on a
set of covariates. In other words, CEM allows comparisons
between treated and untreated observations for each variable
separately without reducing balance in other covariates, and
this approach is particularly appropriate given the small
sample size of MSIs (King & Nielsen, 2019; Wells et al.,
2013). Table 3 shows improved covariate balance after
implementing the CEM procedure (Blackwell et al., 2009),
including covariates based on its associated p value

recommended by Rosenbaum (2002) and Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1984).
Robustness Checks
We used several approaches to check the robustness of
our analyses. First, we included multiple comparison groups
with multiple pre- and posttreatment periods (typically
examining a 1- or 2-year lead and lag) to examine if the
results are consistent (Furquim et al., 2020; Meyer, 1995).
The lead model specifications serve as a falsification test
that the treatment was largely not statistically significantly
associated with the outcomes prior to the adoption of PBF
research metrics for each sample. We also ran the lag model
specifications for institutions that had only one adoption
which stayed in effect in 2020 to address the potential difference between the lagged effect under treatment from the persistent effect despite treatment suspension. The consistent
pattern across model specifications suggested that the average treatment effects of PBF research incentives on treated
institutions were robust regardless of comparison samples.
Additionally, we ran alternative model specifications without the institution-specific linear time trends due to the risk
of overcontrolling for unit-specific trends, which can greatly
reduce the power needed to detect statistical significance
(Furquim et al., 2020). The results of model specifications
without the institution-specific linear time trends are largely
consistent with the findings of our preferred models with
IPSW or CEM adjustments.
We tested the treatment effect on the treated by capturing
whether the PBF research incentive was approved, whether
the PBF research incentive was funded, and whether institutions have the option to opt in to including the research
incentives as part of their PBF system. In additional model
specifications, we controlled for the proportion of PBF
funding relative to total state appropriations as a continuous
variable. Specifically, nearly three quarters of treated institution-year observations (n = 799) have less than 5% of
state appropriations tied to performance metrics, with the
majority of treated institutions with a higher PBF dosage
clustered in the state of Tennessee (n = 153). The results
controlling for PBF dosage are highly consistent with the
results in our preferred model specifications with IPSW or
CEM adjustments.
Limitations
This study was subject to several limitations. First,
according to Jaquette and Parra (2016), IPEDS finance data
have inconsistencies for institutions in a parent–child reporting relationship. We excluded institutions as child records,
which represents less than 1% of the sample, because their
finance data were reported with the parent institutions. In all
analyses, we used data disaggregated by the U.S. Department
7
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0.00
10.69
24.93
29.49
34.90
57.97
13.34
25.28
3.40
8.69
18.39
27.13
0.713 (0.003)
8685.90 (78.88)
4046.79 (109.69)
837.27 (20.49)
1012.56 (34.11)
9157.31 (88.07)
10083.77 (112.27)
198
3,309

65.99
12.68
18.01
3.31
5.97
33.00
13.05
0.733 (0.005)
9158.43 (152.69)
5635.88 (253.89)
752.40 (27.53)
1904.58 (101.84)
10161.80 (164.28)
10445.61 (166.22)
64
1,073

40.99
21.16
37.85
0.127 (0.001)
27.10

Neighboring group

0.00
2.21
20.04
32.08
45.68

52.67
6.43
40.90
0.107 (0.001)
58.36

Treated

52.25
19.78
24.63
3.34
8.29
16.97
24.69
0.688 (0.003)
8784.25 (65.90)
3809.26 (86.39)
1001.63 (20.14)
1069.83 (40.37)
9708.35 (121.70)
10329.40 (108.03)
294
4,772

0.08
11.18
29.36
30.03
29.34

29.89
24.65
45.46
0.114 (0.001)
25.04

National group

66.51
13.09
16.98
3.42%
6.17
32.45
12.52
0.741 (0.005)
9208.88 (156.74)
4832.71 (170.16)
687.55 (23.53)
1486.44 (67.25)
9643.04 (134.53)
10271.06 (166.51)
64
1,039

0.00
0.66
20.68
33.11
45.54

52.85
5.88
41.27
0.106 (0.001)
59.01

IPSW treated

63.38
15.59
18.52
2.51%
9.29
30.25
9.90
0.704 (0.005)
10368.70 (144.35)
6106.85 (312.93)
964.64 (25.40)
1574.47 (66.72)
10201.81 (242.69)
11516.24 (263.24)
290
4,870

0.00
2.27
20.91
30.25
46.57

33.40
23.23
43.37
0.117 (0.001)
24.80

IPSW comparison

Note. Standard error in parentheses. PBF = performance-based funding; IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; HE = higher education; MSI = minority=serving institution; FTE = full-time
equivalent.

State-level covariates
State control
Republican, %
Democratic, %
Divided/others, %
Percentage of state annual appropriation to HE
PBF in place, %
Institution-level covariates
Institutional size, %
Under 1,000
1,000–4,999
5,000–9,999
10,000–19,999
Above 20,000
Location, %
City
Suburb
Town
Rural
Institution has hospital, %
Institution grants a medical degree, %
MSI, %
Percentage of applicants admitted
Tuition and fee revenue per FTE
Federal contract and grant revenue per FTE
State contract and grant revenue per FTE
Local/private contract and grant revenue per FTE
State appropriations per FTE
Instructional cost per FTE
Number of institutions
Number of observations

Covariates

Table 1
Descriptive Summary of the Variables

Table 2
Standardized Differences of the Unweighted and Weighted Sample
Full sample
Variable
Institutional size
Location
Institution has hospital
Institution grants a medical degree
Minority-serving institution
Percentage of applicants admitted
Tuition and fee revenue per FTE
Federal contract and grant revenue per FTE
State contract and grant revenue per FTE
Local/private contract and grant revenue per FTE
State appropriations per FTE
Instructional cost per FTE

NMSI sample

Preweighting

Postweighting

Preweighting

Postweighting

0.486
−0.176
0.005
−0.264
−0.408
0.076
0.322
0.301
−0.052
0.412
0.156
0.245

−0.034
0.035
−0.025
0.078
0.068
0.018
−0.051
0.138
−0.073
−0.007
−0.063
−0.138

0.430
−0.193
−0.060
−0.176

−0.105
0.025
−0.097
0.041
—

−0.016
0.115
0.367
0.014
0.434
0.255
0.240

−0.040
−0.124
−0.015
−0.014
−0.016
−0.057
−0.131

Note. NMSI = non–minority-serving institutions; FTE = full-time equivalent.

Figure 2. Estimated propensity scores pre- and postweighting.

of Education’s Office of Postsecondary Education ID. We
also ran model specifications including institutions in a
parent–child relationship. Across alternative outcome model

specifications, our findings remain highly consistent, indicating that the point estimates were not sensitive to the
parent–child data limitation. IPEDS data have other inherited
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Table 3
Imbalance Measurement of the Continuous Variables Before and After CEM Procedure for MSIs
Variable
Pre-CEM
Tuition and fees revenue per FTE
Federal contract and grant revenue per FTE
Post-CEM
Tuition and fees revenue per FTE
Federal contract and grant revenue per FTE

L1

Mean

Min

25%

50%

75%

Max

0.229
0.529

2516.9
4880.9

1835.3
2126.1

728.2
1216.8

−371.6
4899.3

2763.0
5952.8

8068.4
7752.7

0.128
0.156

836.4
−2232.1

−460.9
13.9

−586.6
−1660.1

−235.9
−4817.6

−522.2
−7190.2

8068.4
7752.7

Note. MSI = minority-serving institutions; CEM = coarsened exact matching; FTE = full-time equivalent.

limitations as the survey items have changed over time, and
we chose to restrict our panel data starting from 2002 to balance data consistency and sample size (Aliyeva et al., 2018;
Delta Cost Project, 2011; Jaquette & Parra, 2016).
In addition, treatment with time-varying adoption
between 2002 and 2018 can bias the estimator and the inclusion of institution-specific trends may not be sufficient
to address potential biases (Goodman-Bacon, 2021).
Unfortunately, the Goodman-Bacon decomposition test only
applies to staggered treatment adoption designs in which an
increasing number of institutions become treated over time.
The bacondecomp command is not applicable to treatments
that turn on and off with a decreased number of treated cases
over time, as is the case with PBF policies with research
incentives that are occasionally abandoned and readopted,
so we cannot examine which comparisons are weighted the
most in the aggregated treatment effect. We followed recommendations by Sun and Abraham (2020) to conduct two-way
fixed-effects (TWFE) event study analyses and estimated
the average treatment effects of PBF research incentives for
institutions that had only one adoption between 2002 and
2018. Coupled with IPSW and CEM models, this approach
allows for variation in treatment timing across multiple periods and the parallel trends assumption to hold conditional on
covariates. This approach can be extremely flexible when
determining control units to consider, and the treatment
effect estimates do not suffer from biases associated with
TWFE regressions with time-varying treatment adoption.
The results for the average treatment effects on treated institutions are largely consistent with the results in our main
analyses for the full sample and subgroups (see online
Supplemental Appendices C and D).
Finally, the sample size in subgroup analyses is relatively
small, which can lead to Type II errors (i.e., when one
accepts a null hypothesis that is actually false). For example,
in the subgroup of MSIs, given the existing sample size and
significance level at 0.05, the statistical power of the treatment coefficient needs to be 1 to reach an effect size of 0.1
in Cohen’s f. Because it is possible that the true effect size of
PBF research metrics can be smaller than 0.1 (i.e., the treatment representing less than 0.012% of variances explained,
10

which may not be substantively meaningful from the policy
perspective), the current model with existing sample size
and power may not detect statistically significant results of
the true effect size. Given this limitation, we urge caution in
the interpretation of null results. In other words, the small
number of MSIs in the sample can lead to estimation bias
such that the true effect of the treatment is not detected by
the current study. The specific types of MSIs included in the
study should not be generalized to all MSIs as a monolith;
rather, our findings should represent the average treatment
effect on the treated MSIs as indicated in online Supplemental
Appendix A.
Results
Descriptive Results
Table 4 presents descriptive differences in the outcome
variables between the treated group and comparison groups.
Before weighting, treated institutions had larger research
expenditures in total ($113.9 million) relative to comparable
institutions in neighboring states ($76.6 million) and comparable institutions in the national group ($67 million).
Accounting for the likelihood of adopting PBF research
incentives, treated institutions had lower research expenditures ($106.4 million) than comparable institutions ($117.7
million) after weighting. The relative share of total institutional expenditures allocated to research was higher for
treated institutions when compared with institutions in any
comparison group before and after weighting. Similarly,
regardless of weighting, the average amount of state appropriations for treated institutions was consistently higher than
the average amount for institutions in any of the comparison
groups.
GDiD Results
We report results for the full sample and MSI and NMSI
subsamples, controlling for state- and institution-level
covariates, institution-level and year fixed effects, and institution-specific linear time trends. Importantly, models using
subsamples according to MSI status do not allow for

Table 4
Descriptive Summary of Dependent Variable
Outcome
Total amount of research
expenditure (in $1,000)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Total amount of state
appropriations (in $1,000)

Treated

Neighboring group

National group

IPSW treated

IPSW comparison

113,910 (5,217)

76,590 (2,800)

67,012 (2,168)

106,446 (4,985)

117,666 (5,027)

0.117 (0.003)

0.070 (0.001)

0.067 (0.001)

0.109 (0.003)

0.097 (0.002)

165,852 (4,571)

118,881 (2,115)

112,539 (1,737)

159,325 (4,186)

154,896 (4,716)

Note. Standard error in parentheses. IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting.

comparisons between MSIs and NMSIs but do allow for an
estimation of the treatment effect on treated institutions
within the subsample of interest. Table 5 presents the treatment effect of adopted PBF research incentives on research
expenditures for the treated institutions, and Table 6 presents the treatment effect of funded PBF research incentives
on research expenditures for the treated institutions.
Consistently, the results indicate that PBF research
incentives, funded or not, are largely not significantly
related to the total amount of research expenditures, the
relative share of total expenditures allocated to research, or
the annual change in total research expenditures for treated
institutions in the full sample or MSI and NMSI subsamples. The only exception was the significantly positive relationship between treatment and the annual change in
research expenditures in the 1-year lag model for the full
sample. When compared with institutions in the comparison
groups, the adoption of PBF research metrics is associated
with a $3.11 million to $ 3.39 million increase in research
expenditures, respectively (p < .05), and the funding of
PBF research metrics is associated with a $2.99 million and
$3.12 million increase in research expenditure, respectively
(p < .05). This increase on the funding of PBF metrics
seems to be driven by the annual change of research
expenditures for NMSIs that treated NMSIs experienced a
$2.34 million increase in research expenditure relative to
untreated NMSIs in neighboring states in the 1-year lag
model (p < .05). The TWFE event study analysis results
are largely consistent with the GDiD findings that the
adoption of PBF research metrics is not associated with
institutions’ research expenditures for the treated institutions (see online Supplemental Appendix C and Figure 3).
However, because of the relatively small sample size of
treated MSIs, the null findings can be due to potential Type
II errors such that the true treatment effect cannot be
detected by this exploratory study.
Additionally, our analysis of the total amount of state
appropriations typically indicates that, funded or not, PBF
research incentives are not statistically related to the total
amount of state appropriations distributed to treated institutions relative to those institutions without PBF research

incentives in the full sample or MSI and NMSI subsamples
(Tables 7 and 8). Consistently, the TWFE event study results
reveal no differences in the total amount of state appropriations between treated and untreated institutions on adopting
PBF research metrics (see online Supplemental Appendix D
and Figure 3). Only in one model specification, the TWFE
event study results provide suggestive evidence that 2 years
after the adoption of PBF research metrics, treated institutions experienced a 0.6% increase in the total amount of
state appropriations received when compared with untreated
institutions in the national sample (p < .05).2 This increase
appears to be driven by treated NMSIs, which experienced a
0.7% to 0.74% increase in the total amount of state appropriations received when compared with untreated NMSIs in
neighboring states and the national sample 2 years after the
adoption of PBF research metrics (p < .05). Similarly,
though the GDiD results indicate a significant relationship
between PBF research metrics and the annual change in
state appropriations distributed to treated institutions for
several groups, the TWFE event study results are either not
statistically significant or indicate a potential violation of
the parallel trends assumption. The preexisting differences
in pretrends can bias the estimates, and readers should
interpret the findings on the relationship between PBF
research metrics and the annual change in state appropriations with caution.
Table 9 indicates the treatment effect of PBF policies
with research metrics on treated institutions while accounting for specific design features of the PBF system. The
results show that the option to self-select PBF research metrics as part of a PBF system is positively related to the relative share of research expenditures as well as total state
appropriations for treated institutions. In other words, institutions that were able to opt into research-oriented metrics as
part of their PBF system experienced a 0.8% to 0.9%
increase in the relative share of research expenditures when
compared with untreated institutions in the neighboring
states or national samples (p < .05). The adoption of mandatory PBF research incentives, however, is associated with a
decrease between 0.4% and 0.8% in treated institutions’ relative share of research expenditures when compared with
11
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−0.002
(0.042)
−0.002
(0.003)
384.015
(1724.917)
0.148
(0.085)
0.001
(0.006)
−2836.813
(7477.328)
−0.026
(0.045)
−0.003
(0.003)
866.082
(1694.361)

0.111
(0.086)
0.001
(0.006)
−3533.756
(7892.887)
−0.025
(0.046)
−0.004
(0.003)
475.105
(1640.116)

National
group

−0.004
(0.042)
−0.003
(0.003)
348.631
(1682.140)

Neighboring
group

−0.029
(0.043)
−0.003
(0.003)
699.961
(1589.152)

0.140
(0.105)
0.002
(0.006)
47.247
(7898.544)

−0.010
(0.038)
0.000
(0.002)
508.149
(1742.511)

IPSW/CEM
group

0.011
(0.044)
−0.002
(0.003)
1918.293
(1227.594)

0.115
(0.071)
−0.003
(0.007)
9306.756
(7974.897)

0.023
(0.040)
−0.001
(0.002)
3387.422*
(1514.915)

Neighboring
group

0.009
(0.043)
−0.001
(0.003)
2002.036
(1267.870)

0.122
(0.072)
−0.002
(0.007)
10193.269
(7403.404)

0.019
(0.039)
−0.001
(0.003)
3315.645*
(1554.360)

National
group

1-year lag

0.011
(0.040)
−0.001
(0.003)
1628.478
(1250.429)

0.098
(0.075)
0.000
(0.007)
11909.024
(7727.110)

0.018
(0.035)
0.001
(0.002)
3109.669*
(1576.600)

IPSW/CEM
group

0.055
(0.037)
0.000
(0.002)
1351.984
(1012.439)

0.064
(0.075)
−0.007
(0.006)
9871.209
(9771.574)

0.057
(0.034)
−0.001
(0.002)
2,388.217
(1501.066)

Neighboring
group

0.062
(0.037)
0.001
(0.003)
1608.819
(1011.008)

0.057
(0.078)
−0.006
(0.006)
9456.546
(9591.058)

0.054
(0.034)
0.000
(0.002)
2,535.716
(1580.339)

National
group

2-year lag

0.066
(0.038)
0.001
(0.003)
889.489
(1066.047)

−0.052
(0.059)
−0.005
(0.006)
8972.271
(13186.013)

0.058
(0.033)
0.002
(0.002)
2,078.260
(1511.245)

IPSW/CEM
group

Note. Standard error in parentheses. All model specifications controlled for institution and year fixed effects, and included institution-specific linear time trends. PBF = performance-based funding;
IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; CEM = coarsened exact matching; MSI = minority-serving institutions; NMSI = non–minority-serving institutions.
*p < .05.

Panel A: Full sample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)
Panel B: MSI subsample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)
Panel C: NMSI subsample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)

Variable

No lag

Table 5
Coefficients of PBF Research Incentives on Research Expenditure
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−0.013
(0.038)
−0.002
(0.003)
−231.584
(1535.297)
0.097
(0.063)
0.004
(0.004)
−2529.864
(6847.081)
−0.031
(0.042)
−0.003
(0.003)
−1.789
(1497.544)

0.064
(0.058)
0.004
(0.004)
−3203.189
(7171.551)
−0.031
(0.042)
−0.003
(0.003)
−278.388
(1449.003)

National
group

−0.014
(0.038)
−0.002
(0.003)
−236.767
(1494.992)

Neighboring
group

−0.033
(0.040)
−0.002
(0.003)
−64.548
(1439.126)

0.083
(0.057)
0.006
(0.004)
635.659
(6933.784)

−0.020
(0.034)
0.001
(0.002)
−242.394
(1557.410)

IPSW/CEM
group

−0.002
(0.040)
−0.001
(0.002)
2342.887*
(1136.710)

0.197
(0.114)
0.000
(0.005)
8131.562
(7467.571)

0.023
(0.040)
−0.001
(0.002)
3115.971*
(1372.532)

Neighboring
group

−0.001
(0.039)
−0.001
(0.002)
2247.462
(1175.977)

0.202
(0.102)
0.001
(0.005)
8807.782
(7105.513)

0.022
(0.039)
0.000
(0.002)
2991.765*
(1401.875)

National
group

1-year lag

−0.001
(0.037)
0.000
(0.002)
1725.866
(1150.020)

0.190
(0.122)
0.004
(0.005)
10229.666
(7508.397)

0.019
(0.035)
0.002
(0.002)
2891.533
(1482.476)

IPSW/CEM
group

0.041
(0.032)
0.000
(0.002)
1059.395
(980.976)

−0.027
(0.125)
−0.003
(0.004)
7993.961
(9170.638)

0.031
(0.032)
0.000
(0.002)
1796.465
(1365.565)

Neighboring
group

0.047
(0.032)
0.001
(0.002)
1293.695
(951.303)

−0.034
(0.134)
−0.003
(0.004)
7763.277
(9015.887)

0.029
(0.032)
0.000
(0.002)
1943.717
(1419.020)

National
group

2-year lag

0.051
(0.033)
0.001
(0.002)
643.556
(1034.622)

−0.123
(0.116)
−0.002
(0.004)
6671.435
(12590.480)

0.037
(0.032)
0.002
(0.001)
1197.222
(1409.948)

IPSW/CEM
group

Note. Standard error in parentheses. All model specifications controlled for institution and year fixed effects, and included institution-specific linear time trends. PBF = performance-based funding;
IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; CEM = coarsened exact matching; MSI = minority-serving institutions; NMSI = non–minority-serving institutions.
*p < .05.

Panel A: Full sample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)
Panel B: MSI Subsample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)
Panel C: NMSI Subsample
Total amount of research
expenditure (logged)
Relative share of research
expenditure
Annual difference of research
expenditure (in $1,000)

Variable

No lag

Table 6
Coefficients of PBF Research Incentives (Funded) on Research Expenditure

Figure 3.

Event study of PBF research incentives for CEM/IPSW Group.

Note. PBF = performance-based funding; CEM = coarsened exact matching; IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting.

untreated institutions (p < .05). The GDiD analyses also
provided suggestive evidence that PBF-adopting institutions
given the option to self-select PBF research incentives are
positively associated with the total amount of state appropriations by 8.9% to 11.3% (p < .05) and an annual change
of total amount of state appropriations between $6.2 million
and $14.7 million (p < .05) relative to institutions without
PBF research incentives.
14

Discussion
This national analysis of the impact of PBF research
incentives provides a complex picture of what happens
after a PBF-adopting state introduces research-oriented
metrics, such as externally funded grants or institutional
R&D expenditures. Contrary to previous research (e.g.,
Rabovsky, 2012), we found that PBF policies with research
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0.027 (0.025)
8542.313***
(2448.610)

−0.005
(0.033)
8659.941
(6236.080)

0.037 (0.029)
8262.085**
(2814.103)

8694.928***
(2564.434)

−0.049
(0.045)
1605.243
(6365.583)

0.050 (0.033)
8217.476**
(2994.503)

National
group

0.038 (0.028)

Neighboring
group

0.015
(0.034)
8817.229**
(3315.957)

0.012
(0.037)
13269.674
(11052.689)

0.014
(0.032)
8602.261**
(2752.997)

IPSW/CEM
group

2359.317
(1643.978)

0.048 (0.043)

−0.045
(0.042)
1714.514
(5101.338)

2999.219
(1566.900)

0.047 (0.035)

Neighboring
group

0.046
(0.037)
3461.976*
(1692.305)

0.044
(0.041)
4534.150
(4812.717)

0.043
(0.030)
3838.987*
(1591.310)

National
group

1-Year lag

0.012
(0.043)
2960.756
(1829.556)

0.022
(0.050)
5341.074
(6553.783)

0.007
(0.041)
1139.868
(1782.704)

IPSW/CEM
group

0.050
(0.042)
3766.228
(2018.646)

−0.005
(0.044)
9409.194
(7157.012)

0.062
(0.035)
4586.885*
(1945.712)

Neighboring
group

0.054
(0.038)
3483.027
(2024.103)

0.095
(0.059)
10283.354
(5932.838)

0.062
(0.032)
4455.706*
(1942.326)

National
group

2-Year lag

0.014
(0.045)
3462.855
(2179.952)

0.095
(0.070)
14975.764*
(5518.212)

0.011
(0.043)
3711.580
(1950.741)

IPSW/CEM
group

Note. Standard error in parentheses. All model specifications controlled for general PBF policy in place/funded, institution and year fixed effects, and included institution-specific linear time trends.
PBF = performance-based funding; IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; CEM = coarsened exact matching; MSI = minority-serving institutions; NMSI = non–minority-serving institutions.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Panel A: Full sample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of
state appropriations (in
$1,000)
Panel B: MSI Subsample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of
state appropriations (in
$1,000)
Panel C: NMSI sample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of
state appropriations (in
$1,000)

Variable

No lag

Table 7
Coefficients of PBF Research Incentives on State Appropriations
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0.016
(0.018)
6687.383**
(2361.043)
−0.001
(0.026)
7204.452
(5638.678)
0.022
(0.022)
6380.861*
(2709.815)

−0.035
(0.034)
2024.030
(5414.461)
0.031
(0.025)
6320.034*
(2856.786)

National
group

0.023
(0.021)
6754.376**
(2444.690)

Neighboring
group

0.003
(0.024)
6369.653*
(3093.607)

0.009
(0.023)
7456.048
(7880.190)

0.003
(0.022)
6003.813*
(2618.211)

IPSW/CEM
group

0.031
(0.031)
2969.788
(1661.538)

−0.033
(0.032)
536.177
(4376.614)

0.030
(0.025)
3047.848*
(1519.560)

Neighboring
group

0.029
(0.027)
3793.626*
(1699.828)

0.035
(0.034)
2713.043
(4227.893)

0.028
(0.022)
3715.526*
(1560.200)

National
group

1-year lag

0.003
(0.028)
3474.008
(1840.379)

0.019
(0.035)
985.004
(4593.076)

0.000
(0.027)
1834.168
(1723.155)

IPSW/CEM
group

3289.939*
(1577.767)

0.032 (0.030)

0.004
(0.033)
5590.044
(5374.546)

0.042
(0.025)
3523.522*
(1454.282)

Neighboring
group

0.036
(0.027)
3182.077*
(1523.927)

0.075
(0.044)
6401.949
(4337.452)

0.043
(0.023)
3593.177*
(1410.967)

National
group

2-year lag

0.007
(0.029)
3003.366
(1792.809)

0.059
(0.045)
5462.673
(4586.449)

0.005
(0.027)
2786.631
(1541.677)

IPSW/CEM
group

Note. Standard error in parentheses. All model specifications controlled for general PBF policy in place/funded, institution and year fixed effects, and included institution-specific linear time trends.
PBF = performance-based funding; IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; CEM = coarsened exact matching; MSI = minority-serving institutions; NMSI = non–minority-serving institutions.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Panel A: Full sample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of state
appropriations (in $1,000)
Panel B: MSI subsample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of state
appropriations (in $1,000)
Panel C: NMSI sample
Total amount of state
appropriations (logged)
Annual difference of state
appropriations (in $1,000)

Variable

No lag

Table 8
Coefficients of PBF Research Incentives (Funded) on State Appropriations
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Self-selected

Mandatory

Self-selected

Mandatory

Self-selected

Mandatory

Self-selected

Mandatory

Self-selected

Mandatory

−0.053
(0.043)
0.940
(0.086)
−0.008*
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.004)
−2322.934
(1,980.530)
4685.457
(2,591.615)
−0.001
(0.033)
0.101**
(0.033)
4566.116
(2,857.130)
14703.31***
(3,874.394)

Neighboring
group
−0.045
(0.042)
0.082
(0.087)
−0.008
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.004)
−2289.225
(2,028.267)
4969.240
(2,621.521)
−0.011
(0.029)
0.089**
(0.032)
4317.992
(2,734.155)
14746.51***
(3,794.192)

National
group
−0.049
(0.039)
0.073
(0.117)
−0.005*
(0.002)
0.007
(0.005)
−1520.263
(1,797.107)
2462.867
(2,103.023)
−0.042
(0.047)
0.086*
(0.040)
5093.328*
(2,174.689)
13460.86**
(4,058.593)

IPSW/CEM
group
−0.033
(0.041)
0.139
(0.080)
−0.007*
(0.003)
0.009*
(0.004)
1517.619
(1,293.561)
6155.331
(3,693.966)
−0.009
(0.041)
0.105**
(0.035)
1103.261
(2,163.597)
4838.262
(2,859.352)

Neighboring
group
−0.034
(0.039)
0.129
(0.080)
−0.007*
(0.003)
0.009*
(0.004)
1300.764
(1,339.329)
6776.057
(3,659.557)
−0.012
(0.036)
0.108**
(0.034)
1801.988
(2,163.910)
6187.381*
(2,936.067)

National
group

1-year lag

−0.026
(0.034)
0.106
(0.102)
−0.004*
(0.002)
0.010
(0.005)
1374.516
(1,222.523)
8317.083
(5,280.432)
−0.033
(0.059)
0.075
(0.041)
2476.314
(1,717.546)
2883.140
(3,939.792)

IPSW/
CEM group
0.037
(0.038)
0.106
(0.068)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.009*
(0.004)
3278.657
(1,909.999)
−251.948
(2,225.881)
0.031
(0.040)
0.091**
(0.034)
6893.64**
(2,427.735)
687.732
(3,184.166)

Neighboring
group

0.032
(0.037)
0.107
(0.068)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.009*
(0.004)
3164.940
(2,047.113)
651.833
(2,191.931)
0.028
(0.037)
0.103**
(0.031)
6305.125*
(2,447.477)
1433.681
(3,157.299)

National
group

2-year lag

0.045
(0.034)
0.060
(0.079)
−0.001
(0.002)
0.008
(0.005)
3467.552
(1,916.662)
−1917.546
(1,986.365)
−0.008
(0.058)
0.074
(0.039)
4728.046
(2,531.510)
5846.029
(5,068.950)

IPSW/
CEM group

Note. Standard error in parentheses. All model specifications controlled for institution and year fixed effects, and included institution-specific linear time trends. PBF = performance-based funding;
IPSW = inverse propensity score weighting; CEM = coarsened exact matching.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Annual difference
of research
expenditure (in
$1,000)
Total amount
of state
appropriations
(logged)
Annual difference
of state
appropriations
(in $1,000)

Total amount
of research
expenditure
(logged)
Relative share
of research
expenditure

Variable

No lag

Table 9
Coefficients of PBF Research Incentive Types on Research Expenditure and State Appropriations

Hu et al.

incentives—regardless of whether they were merely
approved or actually funded—were unrelated to the total
amount of research expenditures or the relative share of
total expenditures allocated to research for treated institutions. This particular finding is typically robust across MSI
and NMSI subsamples and event study results in alignment
with recent advances in econometrics literature (e.g., Sun
& Abraham, 2020).
In addition, we found that PBF research incentives are
largely not related to the total amount of state appropriations
allocated to treated institutions in the full sample and subsamples of MSIs or NMSIs. Although the GDiD results show
some targeted increases in the annual change in research
expenditures and total state appropriations for treated institutions within the subgroups of NMSIs, event study results
largely indicate that no subsample of interest has statistically
significant increases in research expenditures or total state
appropriations, indicating that positive effects in our GDiD
models and should be interpreted with caution.
One area in which there was a positive relationship
between PBF research incentives and institutional research
expenditures was when institutions could self-select or opt
into including research incentives in their performance
agreement with the state. In this case, there was an increase
in the relative share of total expenditures that institutions
allocated to research. On the contrary, when the researchoriented metric was mandated, institutions under the PBF
research metrics policy tended to decrease their relative
share of total expenditures that they allocated to research.
We also found that institutions that were able to select their
own research metrics saw gains in the annual change of the
total amount of state appropriations as well as total state
appropriations. Universities that were able to self-select or
opt into being evaluated based on research performance may
have done so either because they wanted to place a higher
priority on research than other metrics or they knew that the
research performance goals were more easily attainable for
their institution than other goals. Universities that were
required to use PBF research metrics may choose to prioritize other more attainable performance goals, given that
their level of research expenditures can be heavily dependent on their available revenue sources and stability in funding (Leslie et al., 2012).
Although our findings do not align with prior work by
Rabovsky (2012), they do align with the overwhelming
majority of PBF studies suggesting that PBF policies are
typically not related to their outcome of interest, such as
research expenditures (Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016) and retention or degree completion (Ortagus et al., 2020). Additional
work in an international context has focused to a further
extent on research outcomes, suggesting that PBF adoption
within European countries has a positive impact on research
productivity for PBF-adopting colleges and universities
(Aagaard et al., 2015; Cattaneo et al., 2016; Checchi et al.,
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2019; Sīle & Vanderstraeten, 2018; Vanecek, 2014).
However, the funding mechanisms and accountability systems for colleges and universities in European countries are
fundamentally different than those in the United States
(Cretan & Gherghina, 2015), which may explain the distinctions in the present study focused on the United States and
prior studies focused on international contexts.
Implications for Future Research and State Policy
These findings raise questions for future research about
the effects of required versus optional metrics in PBF systems, as self-selection may occur in unintended ways when
institutions are given the option to choose their own metrics.
If institutions select evaluation metrics on which they are
likely to excel, they may improve in these particular areas
but not necessarily in other areas in which state policy makers intend. For instance, future research might examine
whether institutions that select a specific set of metrics see
gains in those metrics while not showing similar gains (or
even showing losses) in other metrics they did not select.
Prior work indicates PBF policies in some states have
become something akin to a “choose your own adventure”
approach to state funding with institutions selecting one or
more metrics on which they will be evaluated (Rosinger
et al., 2020). This study demonstrates that such an approach
may lead to gains, at least in research expenditures, in the
specific metrics selected but also raises questions for future
research about whether improvements will happen along
other metrics as well.
In the case of research metrics, research universities that
are positioned to compete for federal R&D funding may
stand to gain the most under PBF systems that allow institutions to select research metrics as a component of their PBF
funding formula. While a growing number of universities,
including some MSIs (Contreras et al., 2008; Doran, 2015;
O’Meara, 2007), are engaging in striving activities that position themselves to win in competitions for research dollars,
some institutions are better positioned to leverage their
existing financial advantages to garner additional resources
in the form of external research support (Cantwell & Taylor,
2015; Rosinger et al., 2016; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
Research universities with stronger political representation
and external interest groups may advocate for PBF with
research metrics in the policy design process (Ness et al.,
2015; Tandberg, 2010). Under PBF systems with research
incentives, these already-advantaged institutions are also
better positioned to see gains in state resources given that a
portion of appropriations is linked to research expenditures
and institutional efforts to secure external R&D funds.
Similarly, those same institutions may see gains in federal
R&D funds as a result of their efforts, leaving a select group
of well-resourced institutions that stand to potentially gain
both state and federal funds under these systems.
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Less-resourced institutions might reorganize activities
in pursuit of external funding and, in doing so, could see
gains in state support, but such efforts are not likely to
yield the same returns in the form of external R&D support. After all, competition for external resources creates
an environment in which some institutions are positioned
to win while others are not, leading to widening inequities
in resources across institutions (Cantwell & Taylor, 2015;
Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). In other words, PBF systems
with research incentives offer a potential mechanism
through which institutions with greater resources and prestige, which often go hand in hand, are able to have built-in
advantages to pursue prestige-seeking behaviors such that
their relative advantage begets further advantages (Taylor
& Cantwell, 2019).
Under this scenario, PBF systems with research incentives as part of their PBF formula may widen existing funding disparities between higher education institutions, leading
to yet another potential unintended consequence of PBF
policies. Returning to our theoretical framework, our findings are consistent with principal-agent and resource dependence theories—that agents will respond to incentives—but
also highlights how the impacts of PBF are mediated by
complex structures, organizations, and politics with some
institutions better positioned to leverage their greater
resources to obtain more resources.
PBF systems with research incentives that institutions
can opt into could serve to level the playing field for colleges
and universities to be able to compete for both state funds
and external research funds if lower-resourced institutions
are able to reallocate resources toward prioritizing R&D
activity. Since we did not find differential impacts on institutional research expenditures or state appropriations, it is possible that any institution that is able to reallocate funds
toward research activities may see gains in state funding
under such a policy. If so, PBF systems with research incentives that institutions can opt into could serve as one way to
build research capacity of institutions within a state and
thereby better position any institution to compete for both
state and federal dollars.
However, findings from our study also highlight the limitations of PBF research incentives as an effective strategy
for aligning institutional behavior with state workforce and
economic development goals. Absent a PBF policy that
allows institutions to select the metrics on which they are
evaluated, we found no evidence of an impact of PBF
research incentives on institutional research expenditures or
state appropriations. PBF research incentives without the
“choose your own adventure” option may not be an effective
lever when it comes to leveraging state and institutional
resources to compete for and secure external R&D funds.
The limits of PBF in altering institutional behavior to
improve research activities are hardly surprising given
decades of empirical work demonstrating the limits of PBF

policies in the higher education sector when it comes to
other incentivized metrics (Ortagus et al., 2020).
Conclusion
A growing number of PBF policies have included
research-oriented metrics—such as institutional research
expenditures from externally funded grants and broad measures of R&D expenditures—as a way to expand the research
capacity of their public colleges and universities. Although
such a development can lead to improvements in innovation
and economic development throughout the state, it also has
the potential to exacerbate financial inequities facing underresourced institutions, such as MSIs, that may lack the financial flexibility required to build research capacity. In this
study, we typically found that PBF research metrics were not
related to the total amount or relative share of total research
expenditures; however, PBF research incentives are positively related to the annual change in research expenditures,
which captures the difference in research expenditures from
the prior year. Limited and suggestive evidence of positive
effects of PBF research incentives on treated institutions’
research expenditures or state appropriations appears to be
driven by NMSIs, calling into question the potential for disparate impacts of PBF research incentives according to MSI
status. Future research can focus on potential funding inequities among specific types of institutions (e.g., MSIs, less
research-intensive, rural) to build on the current study and
attempt to provide statistically generalizable findings.
In addition, exploratory analyses revealed that the specific design features of the PBF system may be an important
consideration for policy makers seeking to better understand
the implications of incorporating research-oriented metrics
into their state’s PBF system. We showed that mandating
PBF research incentives did not increase research expenditures or state appropriations, but providing the option to selfselect into including research-oriented metrics had some
targeted positive effects on the annual change and total
amount of state appropriations for PBF-adopting institutions. Future PBF should consider the implications—for
equity and effectiveness—of specific PBF policy designs
to identify what works within a state policy that appears to
be a firmly entrenched aspect of higher education finance
throughout the United States.
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Notes
1. The sum of institutions of different MSI types exceeds the
sample size of the MSI subgroup because certain institutions meet
the eligibility criteria of multiple types of MSIs. Tribal colleges and
universities (TCUs) are excluded from the analysis because states
are not obligated to fund TCUs and they receive only 4% of their
revenue from the state on average.
2. We followed Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy
(1981) to interpret the estimated impact of an indicator variable
to be exp(δ − 0.5ν) − 1, where δ is the estimated coefficient of
indicator-coded PBF with research metrics adoption, and ν is the
estimated variance of the estimated coefficient.
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